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Populist Conundrum: Big Banks or Plaintiffs’ Bar?
Banks Win as Congress Overrides the CFPB Rule
Banning Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans have distrusted ambulance-chasing plaintiffs’
attorneys and money-hungry financial service providers for years. 1 The
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB” or “the Bureau”) Final
Rule on Arbitration Agreements (“Final Rule”) pitted these two groups
against each other. 2 The CFPB exercised its authority to limit or prohibit
the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements granted by Section 1028(b)
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) by publishing the Final Rule to the Federal Register on
July 19, 2017.3 The Final Rule prohibited the use of arbitration
agreements that bar consumers from participating in class actions, but did
not prohibit the use of arbitration altogether. 4 The rule became effective
on September 18, 2017, and would have applied to contracts entered into

1. See Nicholas M. Gess et al., Christmas in July for Plaintiffs Bar—CFPB Arbitration
Rule to Take Effect, NAT’L L. REV. (July 14, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
christmas-july-plaintiffs-bar-cfpb-arbitration-rule-to-take-effect (“All of these eventualities
must be viewed against a political backdrop in which the significant concerns of the business
community about the Rule will run up against a federal agency that has substantial support
from consumers who are constituents and voters, and who harbor a strong distrust of the
financial services sector.”); Kenny Stein, Stop President Obama’s Trial Lawyer Giveaway,
FREEDOM WORKS (June 27, 2016), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/stop-presidentobamas-trial-lawyer-giveaway (urging readers of a conservative blog to submit public
comments on the CFPB’s Proposed Rule).
2. See Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4 (repealed 2017) (limiting arbitration
agreements to exclude class action waivers and establishing a monitoring provision to allow
the CFPB to continue observing the use of arbitration in consumer financial services).
3. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210, 33320 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 1040); 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2016) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or
impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future
dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of
conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”).
4. 12 C.F.R. 1040.4 (repealed 2017).
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after March 19, 2018.5 However, the Final Rule was short-lived. 6
Congress used the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”)7 to overturn the
rule when the Senate passed a resolution of disapproval by a narrow 5150 vote on October 24, 2017, with Vice President Mike Pence voting as
the tie breaker.8 The Final Rule would have provided a valuable tool to
improve private enforcement through litigation by allowing consumers to
bring class actions against financial service providers.9 Additionally, the
monitoring provision would have increased transparency in the
arbitration process to further aid in the Bureau’s mission for consumer
protection and keep the opportunity to expedite claims through arbitration
open for consumers who still wish to use it.10 However, concerns about
the costs to the financial services industry and poor popular opinions of
class action lawyers ultimately led to the demise of the Final Rule. 11
This Note examines the Final Rule and concludes that, despite
some flaws, it would have helped consumers and evened the playing field
between consumers and financial service providers. Part II provides a
brief overview of the decades-long debate over the practice of
arbitration.12 Part III analyzes the Final Rule in conjunction with the
Arbitration Study (“the Study”) and argues for why it was ultimately
good for consumers.13 Part IV examines the political climate in which
the Final Rule went into effect and the imperfections that led to its
repeal. 14 Part V briefly summarizes and concludes the Note. 15

5. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210.
6. Ian McKendry, Senate Votes to Repeal CFPB Arbitration Rule in Win for Financial

Institutions, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 2017, at 1.
7. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2016) (allowing both houses of Congress
to pass a joint resolution of disapproval of agency rulemaking to repeal a final rule).
8. Ian McKendry, supra note 6, at 2.
9. 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4(a).
10. Id. § 1040.4(b).
11. McKendry, supra note 6, at 3 (quoting Sen. John Cornyn saying, “There is no reason
for us to enrich a class of lawyers who . . . bring these lawsuits and see consumers getting
pennies on the dollar, which is what the status quo would permit . . . .”).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See infra Part V.
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE ARBITRATION DEBATE
A.

Protections of Arbitration Agreements in the United States

The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) made arbitration
agreements in contract-related disputes valid and enforceable “save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”16 Over the years, arbitration has become a contentious
practice, particularly when pre-dispute arbitration clauses are written into
contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power.17 Issues arise
when consumers are locked into shrinkwrap agreements without knowing
they are agreeing to resolve any disputes against the company through
arbitration—in which the normal rules of evidence, discovery, and
appeals are surrendered in favor of a quick and private proceeding. 18
One of the most controversial aspects of standard arbitration
agreements is that many involve class action waivers, preventing
consumers from joining together to litigate claims that involve small
amounts of harm to a large number of people. 19 This is troublesome when
individual consumers are unlikely to bring a claim at all if the value is not
large enough to make the costs associated with proceeding individually
worth it and are also unable to join a class action.20

16. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).
17. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding in a

controversial decision that the FAA preempted California’s rule on the unconscionability of
class action waivers in consumer contracts); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It has become routine, in a large part due to this Court’s
decisions, for powerful economic enterprises to write into their form contracts with consumers
and employees no-class-action arbitration clauses.”); Letter from Judith Resnik, Professor of
Law, Yale Law School, to the Hon. Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB (Aug. 12, 2016) (“But the
clauses in consumer services and on job application forms do not merit the term ‘contract.’
They are neither bargained for nor bargainable.”).
18. See Richard Frankel, “What We Lose in Sales, We Make Up in Volume”: The Faulty
Logic of The Financial Service Industry’s Response to the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s Proposed Rule Prohibiting Class Action Bans in Arbitration Clauses, 48 ST.
MARY’S L. J. 283, 284–87 (2016) (examining the Final Rule when it was proposed by the
CFPB and arguing that financial service providers are the only parties that benefit from class
action waivers).
19. See id. at 284 (“[I]n the area of consumer financial services—such as banking, credit
cards, and lending agreements—virtually every company that imposes a mandatory
arbitration clause on its customers also includes a provision barring the customer from
participating in a class action or any other joint proceeding.”).
20. Id. at 285.
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Those in support of class action waivers argue that the class
action system is costly and ineffective, and provides little benefit to
consumers at an individual level. 21 For individuals, arbitration tends to
be more efficient and provide larger awards than consumers would be
able to get from class actions.22 Many supporters of class action waivers
argue that the bulk of class settlements are the attorneys’ fees rather than
relief for the consumers. 23 Additionally, critics of the Final Rule argue
that the legal system is overburdened already, and that an increase in class
action litigation will only benefit trial attorneys by generating multimillion dollar legal fees. 24
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., the California
Supreme Court pushed back against the practice of including class action
waivers, and held that class action waivers in consumer contracts were
unconscionable. 25 Several years later, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,26
the U.S. Supreme Court held in a controversial 5-4 decision that
California’s Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA. 27
Concepcion limits a state’s ability to pass legislation that interferes with
the FAA, but Congress can still act, and has previously acted to limit
arbitration agreements in mortgage loans, consumer and securities
broker-dealers, investment advisers, and certain whistleblower
proceedings. 28

21. See Patrick McHenry et al., Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration
Agreements (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=C
FPB-2016-0020-5917&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[W]hatever the Bureau’s
intention, rather than giving consumers greater access to justice, the proposal will make it
more difficult and more expensive for consumers to resolve disputes with service providers.”).
22. See Frankel, supra note 18, at 285 (“Defenders of class action bans . . . respond that
the class action system is broken and imposes huge costs on companies while providing little
or no benefit to consumers.”).
23. See Gess et al., supra note 1 (questioning the reliability of the Arbitration Study for
failing to exclude contingent attorney fees for class actions from its calculations when
evaluating how consumers fare in class actions versus arbitration).
24. See McHenry et al., supra note 21 (arguing that, even if well-intentioned, the Final
Rule would make settling claims with financial service providers more expensive for
consumers).
25. Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 36 Cal.4th 148, 162–63 (2005).
26. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
27. Id.
28. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 at 33211 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040).
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The Arbitration Study and the Final Rule

Section 1028(b) of Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB authority to limit
or prohibit the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.29 Section 1028
originates from a whitepaper released by the Department of Treasury in
June 2009, saying that consumers often do not know that they waive their
rights to trial when they sign contracts to take out a loan and suggesting
that the CFPB30 study the use of arbitration clauses. 31 In order for the
CFPB to exercise its authority to limit or prohibit the use of pre-dispute
arbitration clauses, Dodd-Frank dictated the rule has to be “in the public
interest and for the protection of consumers” and consistent with the
arbitration study authorized by section 1028(a). 32
The CFPB conducted the Study to determine whether to regulate
arbitration.33 The Study focused on measuring the prevalence of
arbitration agreements in consumer financial products and services
contracts and the effects of individual arbitration versus consumer class
actions. 34 The Study focused on six specific consumer financial product
markets: credit cards, checking accounts, prepaid reloadable cards,
private student loans, payday loans, and mobile wireless third-party
billing. 35 Among its findings, the Study found that tens of millions of
consumers are subject to arbitration agreements through their contracts in
these product markets, and nearly all of these arbitration agreements
included class action waivers.36 The Study also surveyed over 1,000
consumers and found that more than half of those subject to arbitration
29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2016) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose
conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a consumer
for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute
between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or
limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”).
30. The whitepaper was written when the CFPB was still known as the Consumer
Financial Protection Agency. David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985,
1038 (Aug., 2017).
31. See id. (arguing that the CFPB’s rule on arbitration falls short of ensuring
enforcement and compliance with consumer financial protection laws).
32. Dodd-Frank §§ 1028(a)–(b), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5518(a)–(b).
33. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) (2015) [hereinafter
ARBITRATION STUDY].
34. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 3321, 33220 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040).
35. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 1, at 7.
36. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33222.
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agreements in their credit card contracts thought they could participate in
a class action lawsuit against the card issuer.37
To illustrate the benefit of consumer financial class actions, the
CFPB analyzed 419 of 422 consumer financial class settlements between
the years 2008 and 2012.38 These settlements involved 350 million class
members total and resulted in a gross recovery amount of $2.7 billion. 39
In addition to the staggering award values, fifty-three of the 419
settlements involving 106 million class members included behavioral
relief to change companies’ harmful practices as part of the settlement. 40
Overall, the CFPB determined that the findings of the Study
necessitated a limit on pre-dispute arbitration clauses, including the
potential to regulate the practice further in the future. 41 In May of 2016,
the CFPB proposed a rule to address concerns about class action waivers
written into pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer financial services
contracts.42 After reviewing the comments received during the public
comment period, the CFPB published the Final Rule on arbitration
agreements to the Federal Register.43
The Final Rule had two parts: (1) it prohibited covered financial
service providers 44 from using class action waivers in covered consumer
financial product or service contracts,45 and (2) it required covered
37. Id. at 33224.
38. Id. at 33233. Three of the class settlements were excluded because the CFPB could

not find data on the attorney’s fees. Id. at 33233 n. 328.
39. Id. at 33234.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 33210.
42. Id. at 33246.
43. Id. at 33247.
44. Service providers include any person that (1) participates in designing, operating, or
maintaining the consumer financial product or service, or (2) processes transactions relating
to the consumer financial product or service. 12 U.S.C. § 5481(26) (2016). Excluded from
this definition are (1) persons regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, (2)
broker dealers, (3) investment advisers, (4) persons regulated by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, (5) federal agencies, (6) providers of less than twenty-five consumers
in a calendar year, (7) merchants, retailers, or sellers of nonfinancial goods or services, (8)
employers providing a product or service to an employee. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R.
§ 1020.3(b) (repealed 2017).
45. Covered products include products and services (1) offering an extension of
consumer credit, (2) extending automobile leases, (3) providing debt management services,
(4) providing consumer credit reports, (5) providing accounts subject to the Truth in Savings
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 (2016), (6) providing accounts subject to the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2016), (7) transmitting or exchanging funds as defined by 12 U.S.C.
§ 5481 (2016), (8) accepting financial or banking data directly from a consumer for the
purpose of initiating payment by a consumer, (9) providing check cashing, check collection,
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providers to submit certain arbitral records and court records to the
CFPB.46 The first part would require covered providers to put language
in the agreements to reflect the limitation on class action waivers. 47 The
CFPB planned on using the records required by the second part of the
rule to monitor arbitral and court proceedings to determine if there are
new developments that raise consumer protection concerns. 48 The CFPB
reserved the ability in the Final Rule to later require these records to be
posted on the CFPB’s website with appropriate redactions to “provide
greater transparency into the arbitration of consumer disputes.” 49 The
Final Rule would have applied to consumer financial product and service
providers in the market of extending consumer credit, brokering
automobile leases, providing debt management services, providing
consumer credit reports, transmitting funds, processing payments, and
collecting debt. 50
III. ANALYSIS OF THE F INAL RULE
A.

Utility of Arbitration

Critics of the rule believe that class actions benefit plaintiffs’
attorneys more than individual consumers, and that a ban on class actions
would deprive consumers of the efficiency of arbitration. 51 The Study
or check guaranty services, and (10) collecting debt arising from any of the aforementioned
consumer financial services. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040.3(a)(1)–(10).
46. Records to be submitted are (1) the initial claim and any counterclaim, (2) the answer
to any initial claim and/or counterclaim, (3) the pre-dispute arbitration agreement filed with
the arbitrator or arbitration administrator, (4) the judgment or award, if any, (5) any
communication from the arbitration or arbitration administrator if an arbitrator refuses to
administer arbitration or dismisses a claim, and (6) any submission to a court seeking
dismissal, deferral, or stay of any aspect of a case. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. §
1040.4(b).
47. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4(a)(2)(i) (“[A] provider shall ensure that
any such pre-dispute arbitration agreement contains the following provision: ‘We agree that
neither we nor anyone else will rely on this agreement to stop you from being part of a class
action case in court. You may file a class action in court or you may be a member of a class
action filed by someone else.’”).
48. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Brenna A. Sheffield, Note and Comment, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration
Clauses in Consumer Financial Products: The CFPB’s Proposed Regulation and Its
Consistency with the Arbitration Study, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2016) (examining the
proposed rule on arbitration prior to the final rule on whether it was consistent with the
standards in Dodd-Frank).
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did not exclude contingent attorneys’ fees from its reports on class action
awards, which critics say inflates the award total when not all of that
amount is going to consumers. 52 The “father of arbitration clauses,” Alan
S. Kaplinsky53 warned that if the rule went into effect, an avalanche of
litigation would follow, further burdening the legal system and depriving
consumers of the benefits of quicker arbitration proceedings. 54
Representative Patrick McHenry and Senator Ben Sasse wrote a letter
endorsed by dozens of other Republican members of Congress,
concerned with the costs of defending class actions being passed on to
consumers and expressed doubt about the way the Study analyzed
consumer outcomes.55 The letter claimed that the Final Rule would make
it more difficult and expensive for consumers to resolve disputes with
their providers than if they went through individual arbitration, and urged
the CFPB to “adopt a less divisive, more reasonable approach” that
“respects the decisions of consumers.” 56 Of the over 6,000 public
comments received on the Proposed Rule, hundreds of nearly identical
comments came from private citizens that poured in during the comment
period calling the Proposed Rule “Obama’s trial lawyer payday.” 57
While arbitration may be more efficient and provide greater
individual award amounts than litigation, few consumers actually use
arbitration to get relief. 58 Consumers enter into arbitration agreements
every day when they acquire checking accounts, private student loans,

52. Gess et al., supra note 1.
53. Alan Kaplinsky is a partner at Ballard Spahr that is said to have “pioneered” the use

of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and helped launch the blog CFPBMonitor.com. Alan S.
Kaplinsky, BALLARD SPAHR LLP, http://www.ballardspahr.com/people/attorneys/
kaplinsky_alan.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2017).
54. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, U.S. Agency Moves to Allow ClassAction Lawsuits Against Financial Firms, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/business/dealbook/class-action-lawsuits-finance-banks.html.
55. McHenry et al., supra note 21.
56. McHenry et al., supra note 21.
57. See, e.g., Jon Bradfield, Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration
Agreements (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-00203318 (“Trial lawyers don’t need any more money than their billable hours.”); Lucia Walrath,
Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration Agreements (Aug. 18, 2016), https:/
/www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0020-2537 (“Obama’s trial lawyer payday
must be stopped.”).
58. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210 (“This final rule is based on the
Bureau’s findings . . . that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are being widely used to prevent
consumers from seeking relief from legal violations on a class basis, and that consumers rarely
file individual lawsuits or arbitration cases to obtain such relief.”).
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prepaid cards, and many other financial products and services. 59 Most
consumers have little understanding of the arbitration agreements in the
contracts they sign or how often they waive their rights to a trial when
entering into these agreements. 60 The American Arbitration Association
(“AAA”) is the largest non-profit arbitration administrator in the United
States and averages under 1,500 consumer arbitration proceedings
annually. 61 For those who do end up seeking legal redress for a claim
against their financial service providers, many claims are too small to
make individual action worth the time, money, and effort.62 For example,
the $30.22 claim in Concepcion would not be worth the legal fees
associated with either arbitration or litigation, if they could even get an
attorney to take their claim to begin with. 63 Because of this, many
consumers are left without any redress at all when their arbitration
agreements involve class action waivers. 64
Not only is arbitration rarely used by consumers, 65 but class
arbitration is virtually nonexistent. 66 The Study identified 1,847
arbitration filings in total for the product markets studied—averaging
about 616 per year for 2010, 2011, and 2012. 67 The CFPB also found
that only two class arbitrations were filed between 2010 and 2012. 68
These numbers are shockingly low, considering millions of consumers
are covered by these arbitration agreements and thirty-two million
consumers benefit from class actions altogether each year. 69

59. See id. at 33211 (“In the last few decades, companies have begun inserting arbitration
agreements in a wide variety of standard-form contracts….”).
60. See id. at 33224 (“[T]he survey found that consumers generally lacked awareness
regarding the effects of arbitration agreements.”).
61. Resnik, supra note 17, at 3 (“[T]housands of courts operate in the state and federal
systems, where civil filings are estimates to run between 25 and 47 million cases annually,
excluding about 50–60 million juvenile and traffic cases.”).
62. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 4 (“My goal is to turn attention to the underlying fact
that almost no consumers or employees ‘do’ arbitration at all.”).
63. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for
the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”).
64. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 4 (“My goal is to turn attention to the underlying fact
that almost no consumers or employees ‘do’ arbitration at all.”).
65. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33227.
66. Id. at 33227.
67. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 20.
68. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33227.
69. Resnik, supra note 17.
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Class Actions as an Enforcement Tool

To supporters of the rule, class action waivers are seen as
hindering enforcement through private litigation, essentially giving
companies a “get out of jail free” card.70 Richard Cordray, director of the
CFPB at the time of the Study, said that by blocking group lawsuits,
mandatory arbitration clauses block consumers’ ability to seek legal
redress “when a little harm happens to a lot of people.”71 A comment
letter submitted by Senator Harry Reid and signed by thirty-seven fellow
Senators commended Cordray on the proposed rule and stressed the
importance of class actions for consumer protection.72 Senator Reid’s
letter asserted that class action waivers protect corporations from
accountability for “abusive, anti-consumer practices,” which allows for
these practices to continue unchecked. 73
Beyond monetary relief for individual consumers, the Final Rule
would have provided a huge benefit to consumers by encouraging private
enforcement through litigation.74 Because of the scarceness of arbitration
proceedings, it is difficult to ensure that consumer financial service
providers are maintaining ethical business practices.75 Arbitration
proceedings lack the independence of elected or appointed judges and
published opinions available for public inspection. 76
The CFPB studied the utility of class actions as an enforcement
tool by analyzing the extent to which private class actions overlapped
with government enforcement actions, and which types of actions
occurred first when the two overlapped. 77 The CFPB found that for 88%
70. See Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES : DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/201
5/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html
(beginning a three-part series on arbitration in consumer and employment contracts); Noll,
supra note 30, at 986 (arguing that the CFPB’s rule on arbitration falls short of ensuring
enforcement and compliance with consumer financial protection laws).
71. Richard Cordray, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumers-sue-companies.html?mcubz=3.
72. Harry Reid et al., Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration
Agreements (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-00201482.
73. Id.
74. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 at 33210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040).
75. Resnik, supra note 17, at 3.
76. Resnik, supra note 17, at 3.
77. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33237.
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of public enforcement actions, there was not an overlapping private
action. 78 For 68% of the private class actions, there was not an
overlapping public enforcement action. 79 When the two did overlap,
private class actions tended to come before government enforcement
actions. 80 The CFPB interpreted this data to mean that private class
actions complement government enforcement, especially given
increasing limitations on resources available to regulators. 81
The enforcement value of class actions was also demonstrated by
the fifty-three settlements that mandated a change in harmful practices
the Study analyzed. 82 These settlements affected at least 106 million
individual class members.83 While some of those class members may no
longer have contractual relationships with the defendant companies, that
number also does not account for future consumers who will
unknowingly benefit from the changes. 84
C.

Monitoring Requirement and Arbitration Transparency

The monitoring rule would have provided transparency for the
arbitration process and helped the CFPB assess whether there is a need to
regulate arbitration agreements further by requiring covered providers to
submit arbitral and court records to the CFPB. 85 The CFPB was
particularly concerned with monitoring for arbitrations administered by
biased administrators.86 Some consumer advocates submitted comments
claiming that arbitration can never be neutral because of biases towards
“repeat players.”87 While the CFPB did attempt to analyze this longalleged bias, it maintained that the results of the Study did not identify an
obvious bias favoring repeat players. 88 The small pool of data was a clear
limitation on the ability of the Study to fully analyze this issue. 89 By
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 33234.
Id.; ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 8, at 22.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 8, at 23, n. 42.
Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33310.
Id. at 33253.
Id. at 33228.
Id.
Id.; ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 58.

176

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 22

continuing to monitor the results of arbitration relating to consumer
financial products and services, the CFPB could have acted further if it
determined there were new “developments that raise consumer protection
concerns.”90
While the CFPB maintains that the results of the Study were not
conclusive in determining a “repeat player” bias, the data it collected did
seem to lean in that direction. 91 The Study looked at 158 disputes with
affirmative consumer claims across all product markets brought in the
years 2010 and 2011 and their outcomes broken into which disputes
involved “repeat players” on either side. 92 For the disputes involving a
repeat company and no consumer lawyer, only four out of thirty-eight
disputes ended with any form of award for the consumer. 93 When there
was a repeat company and a non-repeat consumer lawyer, nine out of
twenty-one consumers saw an award. 94 When both parties involved a
repeat player, only thirteen out of eighty-five consumers had any type of
award.95 The sample size for non-repeat companies was small, with six
out of fourteen disputes ending with a consumer award. 96 Overall, only
thirty-two disputes out of the 158 disputes studied ended with a grant of
relief for consumers. 97 The Study was clearly limited by such a small
sample size overall, but the results do tend to show that repeat companies
seem to fare better in these disputes than consumers, especially
consumers with a non-repeat attorney or no attorney at all.98 If a larger
sample size reveals the opposite or a statistically insignificant effect, the
CFPB could have chosen not to regulate arbitration further by banning
arbitration agreements altogether.99
The AAA provided these disputes, filed by consumers or
companies from the beginning of 2010 through the end of 2012, to the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 56–68.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 67.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 67.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 67.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 67.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 67.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 67.
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 67.
See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210, 33252 (July 19, 2017) (codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) (“[The CFPB] preliminarily found that a comparison of the relative
fairness and efficiency of arbitration and individual litigation was inconclusive and thus that
a total ban on the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer finance contracts was
not warranted at that time.”).
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CFPB pursuant to a non-disclosure agreement.100 The authority to
continue monitoring specified arbitral and court records would have
helped the CFPB keep track of particular risks to consumers by noting
trends in the types of violations being enforced through private
enforcement actions without having to rely on private arbitration
administrators to turn over information limited by short time frames and
non-disclosure agreements. 101 The monitoring rule would have also
helped the CFPB take enforcement action against providers that are
repeatedly harming consumers. 102 Class actions and the court system as
a whole are not perfect, but with litigation comes extensive
documentation and recordkeeping subject to public scrutiny.103 Holding
arbitration administrators accountable in the same way that we expect
from courts is the first step in improving the system in a way that can
actually benefit both consumers and companies. 104
One of the most prevalent criticisms of the Final Rule was that
the Study was “deeply flawed.” 105 Despite its flaws, the Study took on
an extremely challenging proposition by attempting to study trends in
arbitration.106 Since arbitration often keeps plaintiffs from filing claims,
claims that actually do get brought to arbitration may tend to be only
significantly stronger cases and claims for higher dollar amounts, and
therefore not representative of all of the harms to consumers that go
unchecked. 107 It is also difficult to quantify success, as many arbitral
awards may include equitable relief or nominal damages. 108 Despite
these difficulties, which critics of the Final Rule may label as “flaws,” the
CFPB concluded in the Study that plaintiffs in consumer financial
arbitrations prevailed only 20% of the time. 109 The monitoring provision
would allow the CFPB to continue studying the fairness of arbitration for

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 1 at 7.
Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 at 33237.
Id.
Resnik, supra note 17.
Resnik, supra note 17.
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v.
CFPB, No. 3:17-cv-02670-D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017).
106. See David Horton & Andrea C. Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57, 76 (2015) (“Studies of consumer arbitration
awards are important but challenging to execute.”).
107. Id. at 77.
108. Id.
109. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5.6.6, at 41.

178

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 22

consumers, and could have helped make up for what the Study lacked in
resources and practicality.110
IV. FAILURE OF THE FINAL RULE
A.

The Political Climate and Events Surrounding Reversal of the
Final Rule

Challenges to the Final Rule appeared almost immediately after
it was published in the Federal Register.111 The House of Representatives
passed a resolution of disapproval under the CRA on July 25, 2017, just
six days after the Final Rule was published. 112 The House vote was
mostly along party lines, gathering the necessary votes in a relatively
short period of time. 113 The Senate, however, experienced more difficulty
in gathering support for the resolution, leaving uncertain the fate of the
Final Rule for several months while the issue was publicly debated. 114
1. Wells Fargo Unauthorized Accounts Scandal
The issue of the Wells Fargo unauthorized accounts scandal
resurfaced following the House vote, reminding the public of a prime
example of “when a little harm happens to a lot of people.” 115 In
September 2016, news broke that Wells Fargo employees created
110. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1040) (“The Bureau will use the information it collects to continue monitoring
arbitral and court proceedings to determine whether there are developments that raise
consumer protection concerns that may warrant further Bureau action.”).
111. See David Sherfinski, House Votes to Undo Federal Consumer Bureau’s Arbitration
Rule, WASH. TIMES (July 25, 2017), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jul/
25/house-votes-to-undo-consumer-financial-protection-/ (“House Republicans moved [July
25, 2017] to rein in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, approving a legislative veto
of a new rule that would have made it easier for people to join class-action lawsuits.”).
112. Id.
113. See id. (reporting that the House voted to repeal the Final Rule less than a week after
it was published to the Federal Register).
114. See Kate Berry & Ian McKendry, Four Questions as Senate Vote Nears on CFPB
Arbitration Rule, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 2017 [hereinafter Berry, Four Questions] (“The GOP
appears to have barely enough votes to roll back the contentious CFPB rule . . . . But victory
was not assured, as key GOP senators were still a question mark.”).
115. Richard Cordray, Opinion, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumers-sue-companies.html?m
cubz=3; Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo May Have Found More Fake Accounts Created by
Employees, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/
business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fraud-accounts.html?mcubz=0.
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millions of fake accounts under the names of real costumers in order to
meet demanding sales quotas.116 Some customers only discovered the
misconduct when they were charged fees on the fraudulent accounts. 117
In August 2017, shortly after the House vote, reports surfaced that over a
million more unauthorized accounts were discovered on top of the 2.1
million originally reported. 118 This news came after the financial
institution paid $185 million in fines and penalties, and $142 million to
settle class-action claims.119 The harms done to consumers by the
unauthorized accounts included fees charged on the accounts, harm to
credit scores, and calls from debt collectors. 120 Many of the refunds
issued to consumers were fairly small and averaged about $25. 121
In addition to the newly discovered fake accounts causing the
scandal to resurface, Wells Fargo has also been in hot water over charging
illegal fees to veterans to refinance their mortgages and inadvertently
jeopardizing customers’ personal information when responding to a
subpoena in an ongoing civil suit in New Jersey. 122 The Wells Fargo
scandal drew national criticism and dominated headlines, but for
consumers wrongfully charged $25 in other situations, bringing an
individual arbitration is simply not realistic when the costs of time and
money outweigh the damage done by the financial service. 123
2. Equifax Breach
In addition to the ongoing investigations into the Wells Fargo
scandal, a massive breach of consumer data occurred at Equifax and put
143 million consumers at risk leading up to the deadline for the Senate to

116. Cowley, supra note 115.
117. Cowley, supra note 115.
118. See Cowley, supra note 115 (“[I]ts review of potentially unauthorized accounts could

reveal a ‘significant increase’ in the number of accounts involved, up from the 2.1 million
that it previously estimated.”).
119. Cowley, supra note 115.
120. See Michael Corkery, Wells Fargo Fined $185 Million for Fraudulently Opening
Accounts, N.Y. TIMES : DEALBOOK (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/
business/dealbook/wells-fargo-fined-for-years-of-harm-to-customers.html (reporting on the
harms done to Wells Fargo customers).
121. Id.
122. Cowley, supra note 115.
123. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual
suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
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vote on reversing the Final Rule pursuant to the CRA and brought
consumer financial concerns into the limelight. 124 Following the breach,
Equifax offered free credit monitoring services to the affected
consumers.125 The free services, however, were accompanied by predispute arbitration clauses written into the terms and conditions. 126
Equifax quickly tried to remedy the situation by announcing that the
arbitration clause would not apply to consumers affected by the breach,
and multiple class-action lawsuits were filed shortly after. 127
Despite Equifax backpedaling on its arbitration clause a few days
128
later, the story became a prime example of why the Final Rule would
have benefited consumers. 129 Congressman Brad Sherman, sitting on the
House Financial Services Committee, spoke harshly of Equifax for the
way the company handled the situation, accusing Equifax of attempting
to “sneak in” an arbitration provision to the free credit monitoring
services meant to mitigate the damage of the massive breach. 130 Senator
Elizabeth Warren, a vocal supporter of the Final Rule, 131 took to Twitter

124. See Ian McKendry, Equifax Breach May Kill Repeal of CFPB Mandatory Arbitration
Rule, AM. BANKER, Sept. 8, 2017 [hereinafter McKendry, Equifax Breach] (“The massive
breach at Equifax is likely to hurt — and may ultimately doom — efforts by Republicans to
overturn the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s rule banning mandatory arbitration
clauses.”).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. David Lazarus, The Real Outrage Isn’t Equifax’s Arbitration Clause – It’s All the
Others, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/lafi-lazarus-equifax-arbitration-clauses-20170912-story.html.
128. See id. (quoting Equifax spokesperson Wyatt Jeffries saying “…we will not apply
any arbitration clause or class-action waiver against consumers for claims related to the free
products offered in response to the cybersecurity incident or for claims related to the
cybersecurity incident itself.”).
129. See McKendry, Equifax Breach, supra note 124 (“Yes, it was slimy for the company
to try to deny people their right to sue or to join class-action lawsuits. But no, Equifax was by
no means alone in pulling such a stunt.”).
130. McKendry, Equifax Breach, supra note 124.
131. This is unsurprising considering § 1028 of Dodd-Frank originated from a Treasury
Department whitepaper that was supposedly influenced by Warren while she was still a law
professor. In 2007, while Elizabeth Warren was a law professor at Harvard, she published an
article named Unsafe at Any Rate, which influenced a bill introduced during the Bush
administration to establish a “Consumer Credit Safety Commission.” The bill was not passed,
but during the Obama administration the idea was revived and was included in the DoddFrank Act. Donald C. Lampe & Ryan J. Richardson, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau at Five: A Survey of the Bureau’s Activities, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 85, 91–92 (2017);
Noll, supra note 30, at 1039.
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to advocate for it, saying that it would prohibit companies like Equifax
from avoiding legal accountability. 132
3. Clashing Agencies and Organizations
The Equifax breach and continued Wells Fargo scandal almost
killed support for repeal of the Final Rule, but the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) released findings that caused a tilt
in the other direction.133 In September 2017, the OCC released a paper
estimating the probable costs to consumers resulting from the Final
Rule.134 Then-acting Comptroller of the Currency Keith Noreika said at
a fintech conference following the release of the paper that there could be
as high as a 3.5% annual percentage rate increase in the cost of consumer
credit.135 However, the paper issued by the OCC admitted to some of the
same weaknesses the CFPB faced with the Study, showing “substantial
uncertainty” about the potential effects to the cost of consumer credit. 136
The OCC’s paper estimated an expected increase of 3.43% for customers
of the institutions involved in the Ross settlements, the same data set
analyzed by the CFPB to estimate the effects of the Final Rule on
consumer costs.137 Regardless, the uncertainty from both the CFPB and
the OCC was concerning. 138
The United States Chamber of Commerce, together with other
corporate lobbying groups, also joined the fight against the Final Rule by

132. See Elizabeth Warren (@SenWarren), TWITTER (Sept. 8, 2017, 12:52 PM), https://
twitter.com/SenWarren/status/906198646659715072 (“The @CFPB’s new rule would stop
companies like @Equifax from avoiding legal accountability like this – as long as @GOP
doesn’t reverse it.”).
133. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE C URRENCY, OCC REVIEW: PROBABLE
COST TO CONSUMERS RESULTING FROM THE CFPB’S FINAL RULE ON ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS (Sept. 20, 2017) (criticizing the Final Rule by presenting findings about the
likelihood and magnitude of costs that would be passed onto consumers).
134. Id.
135. Arbitration Rule to Raise Cost of Credit 25 Percent, OCC Study Finds, ABA
BANKING J. (Sept. 28, 2017) https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2017/09/noreika-arbitrationrule-to-raise-cost-of-credit-25-percent-occ-study-finds/?utm_campaign=ABA-Newsbytes092917-HTML&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Eloqua.
136. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 133, at 3.
137. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 133, at 4–5.
138. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 133, at 4–5 (“The
magnitude of the likely effect on pricing is uncertain.”); see also ARBITRATION STUDY, supra
note 33, § 10 at 6 (“We are unable to identify any such evidence from the data.”).
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filing a lawsuit against the CFPB on September 29, 2017.139 The
complaint was filed in federal court in Dallas, and named the American
Bankers Association, the American Financial Services Association, the
Consumer Bankers Association, the Financial Services roundtable, and
multiple Texas corporate lobbying groups as plaintiffs in addition to the
Chamber of Commerce. 140 The complaint alleged that Dodd-Frank
created an unconstitutional structure for the CFPB, that the Final Rule
violates the Administrative Procedure Act because the Study was “deeply
flawed,” and the Final Rule violates Dodd-Frank by failing to advance
the public interest or consumer welfare. 141
The attacks did not end with the OCC and Chamber of
Commerce. 142 On October 23, 2017, the Department of Treasury
followed the OCC in issuing a statement against the Final Rule. 143 The
report from the Treasury served to echo the OCC’s condemnation of the
rule, but did not offer any new findings about the Final Rule’s impact on
consumer costs.144 Sam Gilford, a spokesperson for the CFPB, responded
that the Treasury report did nothing more than bring up arguments that
have already been analyzed in depth. 145
On the other end of the spectrum, the American Legion, the
country’s largest veterans’ organization, joined prominent Democrats
and consumer groups to oppose the resolution of disapproval. 146 The
veterans’ organization remains concerned with unfair and burdensome
lending practices targeting servicemembers and their families. 147 At the
American Legion’s ninety-ninth national convention, it passed a

139. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Chamber of Commerce of U.S.
v. CFPB, No. 3:17-cv-02670-D (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) (complaint from lawsuit).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, LIMITING CONSUMER CHOICE, EXPANDING COSTLY
LITIGATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CFPB ARBITRATION RULE (Oct. 23, 2017).
143. See id. (the statement).
144. See Kate Berry & Ian McKendry, Fight to Kill CFPB Arbitration Rule Could Rest on
Whose Data is Right, AM. BANKER, Oct 23, 2017 [hereinafter Berry, Fight to Kill CFPB
Arbitration Rule] (“The Treasury report did not present its own finding on projected consumer
costs but instead praised the OCC’s review.”).
145. Id.
146. See THE AMERICAN LEGION, RESOL. NO. 83: PROTECT VETERAN AND SERVICEMEMBER
RTS. TO FAIR CONSUMER ARBITRATION (Aug. 22–24, 2017) (“The American Legion oppose
legislation to repeal the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s rule on arbitration
agreement.”).
147. Id.
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resolution in support of the Final Rule and, more specifically, against
Congress repealing it.148
A late-night vote by the Senate ended the Final Rule, with only
two Republicans defecting from the vote: Lindsey Graham and John
Kennedy. 149 Not only did the exercise of the CRA stop the Final Rule in
its tracks, but it prevents the CFPB from writing a “substantially similar”
rule without receiving congressional approval requiring sixty votes in the
Senate.150
Richard Cordray called the repeal “a giant setback” for
consumers.151 Following the vote by the Senate, Cordray urged President
Trump to veto the CRA repeal.152 In his letter to President Trump,
Cordray admitted that he may be “wasting [his] time” by writing the
letter, but wanted to make a personal appeal to the President to protect
consumers anyway. 153 Cordray urged President Trump to follow the
support of the American Legion and the Military Coalition by vetoing the
repeal. 154 Despite Cordray’s personal appeal, President Trump signed the
resolution of disapproval and put an end to the Final Rule. 155
This repeal and the events leading up to it highlight an ongoing
battle with Cordray and the CFPB on one side, and the Trump
Administration and Republican-controlled Congress on the other.156 The
repeal had full support from the Trump Administration working in its
favor, with Vice President Pence acting as the tie-breaker.157 With
Noreika, a Trump appointee, as the temporary head of the OCC, the OCC

148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
McKendry, supra note 6, at 2.
McKendry, supra note 6, at 2.
See McKendry, supra note 6, at 2 (statement of CFPB Director Richard Cordray)
(“Wall Street won and ordinary people lost. Companies like Wells Fargo and Equifax remain
free to break the law without fear of legal blowback from their customers.”).
152. Letter from Richard Cordray, Dir. of CFPB, to President Donald J. Trump (Oct. 30,
2017) (on file with the CFPB).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Evan Weinberger, Trump Officially Kills CFPB Arbitration Rule, LAW360 (Nov. 15,
2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/980811/trump-officially-kills-cfpb-arbitration-rule.
156. See Kate Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated Gamble on CFPB Arbitration Rule, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 26, 2017 [hereinafter Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated Gamble] (arguing that
the failure of the Final Rule was a result of a political miscalculation by Cordray, and that
repeal could have been prevented by tempering the rule or waiting until a Democratic
administration to finalize it).
157. Kate Berry, Is Arbitration Win a Turning Point for Banks?, AM. B ANKER, Oct. 25,
2017 [hereinafter Berry, Turning Point].
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newly inserted itself into the battle when it released its statement
condemning the Final Rule. 158 The CFPB also had to cope with the
Treasury reiterating the OCC’s concerns, with Steven Mnuchin at the
head of the Department, another Trump appointee. 159
4. The Trump Administration and the CRA
The use of the CRA also highlights a common theme of the
Trump presidency so far.160 The CRA allows Congress to review “major
rules”161 and pass a resolution of disapproval to repeal them within sixty
legislative days of the rule being published to the Federal Register. 162 The
CRA was enacted in 1996,163 but had only been used to overturn a
regulation once prior to the Trump Administration.164 Since President
Trump took office, the CRA has been used fifteen times to overturn
Obama-era regulations. 165
The CFPB waiting too long to publish the Final Rule may have
contributed to its failure. 166 The Study was published in 2015, and it took
until the second half of 2017 for the Final Rule to be published. 167 The
Final Rule may have fared better under the Obama Administration, giving

158. See Kate Berry, OCC-CFPB Spat Takes Interagency Discord to a New Level, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 18, 2017 (“Before [Noreika] became acting comptroller in May, the OCC had
not objected to the CFPB’s arbitration policy.”).
159. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 142 (prepared after Mnuchin was
confirmed).
160. See Berry, Four Questions, supra note 114 (“Before this year, the Congressional
Review Act was a relatively obscure vehicle for members of Congress to try to undo
regulations on various sectors.”).
161. “Major rule” is defined as any rule which the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget finds is likely to result in (1) an annual effect
on the economy of $100,000,000 or more; (2) a major increase in costs or prices for
consumers, individual industries, government agencies, or geographic regions; or (3)
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, or
innovation. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2016).
162. 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2016).
163. Id.
164. In 2001, the CRA was used to overturn a Department of Labor rule. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Congressional Review Act FAQs, http://www.gao.gov/legal/
congressional-rewiew-act/faq (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
165. At the time this Note was published in February of 2018, the CRA was used fifteen
times to pass resolutions of disapproval since President Trump took office. Id.
166. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210, 33403 (July 19, 2017) (codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) (publishing the Final Rule to the Federal Register on July 19, 2017);
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33 (reporting to Congress in 2015 the results of the Study).
167. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210; ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33.
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the very President who appointed Cordray the opportunity to veto the
repeal if the CRA was still utilized. 168 Instead, the CFPB published the
Final Rule after President Trump took office and Congress began using
the CRA to roll back regulations enacted under President Obama. 169
Additionally, the battle over the Final Rule waged while many were
already speculating that Richard Cordray was going to step down or
President Trump was going to find a reason to fire him. 170
B.

Costs to the Banking Industry and Pass-Through to Consumers

While the criticisms from the OCC and the Treasury may have
had political motivations at the forefront, the uncertainty of the passthrough costs to consumers was a fatal flaw for the Final Rule. 171 The
CFPB estimated that this rule would expose about 53,000 providers of
consumer financial products and services to class actions.172 It estimated
that this would result in 103 additional class action settlements in federal
courts with an additional $342 million paid out to consumers. 173
To analyze whether these additional awards and the expenses of
defending these cases would pass on costs to consumers, the Study looked
at the settlements in Ross v. Bank of America174 in which certain credit
card companies agreed to remove pre-dispute arbitration clauses from
their consumer contracts for at least three and a half years. 175 Based on
the Ross settlements, the CFPB found that there was not any “statistically
significant evidence that the price of consumer credit card services
increased after the Ross settlers eliminated pre-dispute arbitration clauses
168. See Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated Gamble, supra note 156 (suggesting that the
CFPB should have delayed the Final Rule until a Democratic administration).
169. See Berry, Four Questions, supra note 114 (“[The Congressional Review Act] has
picked up steam under the Trump administration as leaders [in] both GOP-controlled houses
of Congress look to reverse Obama-era rules.”).
170. See Elizabeth Dexheimer & Mark Niquette, CFPB’s Cordray to Step Down, Allowing
Trump to Remake Agency, Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 2 (Nov. 16, 2017) (“Republicans
have long urged Trump to remove Cordray, arguing that he lacks accountability and that the
agency has stifled lending.”).
171. See Berry, Fight to Kill CFPB Arbitration Rule, supra note 144 (“[O]pposing sides
in the arbitration debate – both in and out of government – are still battling over whose data
is more credible.”).
172. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33403.
173. Id.
174. Ross v. Bank of Am., No. 05 Civ. 7116(WHP), 2006 WL 36909 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2010).
175. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 6.
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from their credit card agreements.” 176 However, industry commenters
and a trade association noted that the temporary nature of the moratorium
and the fact that larger institutions like Bank of America are slow to
change prices made the Ross case study inappropriate. 177
The CFPB asserted that the providers would have a larger
incentive for compliance, and any costs passed onto consumers would be
balanced by fewer harmful business practices by providers. 178 In addition
to changes in conduct as the result of injunctive relief, the CFPB hoped
that consumers would also benefit from the reporting requirements
providing more transparency into arbitration, a process that has long
benefited from the results being kept confidential. 179 The uncertainty of
the extent of the costs being passed on to consumers was ultimately
detrimental to the Final Rule.180
C.

De Facto Ban on Arbitration

While some consumer advocates wanted to see a complete ban of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer financial
service and product contracts,181 the CFPB chose instead to prohibit only
class action waivers in the Final Rule. 182 The CFPB did not claim that all
arbitration proceedings are inherently unfair to consumers. 183 Not many
consumers actually arbitrate disputes, but consumers who did participate
in arbitration and ultimately prevailed on their claims were awarded more
substantial individual awards, averaging about $5,400 for the cases
studied by the CFPB from 2010 to 2012. 184 Additionally, the CFPB did
not identify an obvious bias favoring repeat players. 185

176.
177.
178.
179.

ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 10.1, at 7.
Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33238.
Id. at 33410.
See id. (“[P]rovisions . . . [will] provide greater transparency into the arbitration of
consumer disputes.”).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 33252.
182. Id. at 33210.
183. Id. at 33252.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 33253.
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Industry commenters argued that the Final Rule would amount to
a total ban on arbitration.186 If consumer financial service providers
cannot use arbitration clauses to prevent the costs of defending class
litigation, they argue, the Final Rule will end the practice of using
arbitration in the financial services industry altogether. 187 This argument
makes it seem like financial institutions favor arbitration clauses
precisely because they preclude certain claims. 188
Considering the uncertainties that still remain about the effects of
the Final Rule, particularly concerning the costs that will be passed on to
consumers, the CFPB should have proposed a less ambitious rule. 189 In
the Final Rule, the CFPB reserved the right to further regulate arbitration
if the monitoring provision uncovered inherent unfairness in arbitration
proceedings resulting from repeat player biases that the Study was unable
to adequately quantify. 190 If the CFPB chose to simply continue data
collection and implement the monitoring rule, but still reserved this right
to further regulate the practice in the future, the Agency may have been
able to craft a rule that could withstand interference from Congress. 191 In
the meantime, consumers and financial service providers could still use
arbitration for its efficiency in individual actions, while the CFPB
adopted a watchdog status over the practice. 192 Consumer advocates may
not have been as pleased with a rule with less teeth, but such a rule would
have given the CFPB the ability to regulate more easily in the future. 193

186. See Frankel, supra note 18, at 287 (“[M]any in the financial services industry predict
that if companies cannot use arbitration as a means of banning class actions, they will not use
arbitration at all.”).
187. Frankel, supra note 18, at 286.
188. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 2 (“[D]espite the heralding of arbitration as a speedy
and effective alternative to courts, the mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted
in ‘mass arbitration.’”).
189. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 133, at 3 (uncertain
costs); CFPB supra note 30, § 10.1, at 7 (no significant evidence of costs).
190. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33252.
191. See Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated Gamble, supra note 156 (“Had the agency
tempered the rule instead of banning all mandatory arbitration clauses in financial contracts,
it could have avoided having it repealed by Congress.”).
192. See McHenry, supra note 21 (calling arbitration highly-effective, low cost and fair).
193. See Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated Gamble, supra note 156 (“The CFPB’s loss has
big consequences for the agency – under the Congressional Review Act, they are prevented
from adopting a future rule that is ‘substantially similar’.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
While the Study had its flaws,194 the Final Rule was a step in the
right direction for the CFPB to continue monitoring the practice of
arbitration.195 Most importantly, the Final Rule would have allowed
consumers to seek relief against harmful conduct by providers, and
consequently providers would have been pressured into changing
questionable practices that spread small damages across large amounts of
consumers.196
Where the Study lacked the resources to appropriately study a
large sample of arbitration proceedings, the monitoring provision would
have allowed the CFPB to continue observing these practices. 197 Should
a complete ban on arbitration agreements in consumer financial contracts
have become necessary, the CFPB would have been able to make that
determination at a later date.198 However, financial institutions and their
allies in Congress did not view the Final Rule as being the middle ground
that the CFPB and its supporters did. 199
The flaws in the Final Rule may have resulted in a huge loss of
opportunity for the CFPB.200 While repeal of the Final Rule does not
mean the chance is gone forever, sixty votes in the Senate to give the
CFPB permission to publish a substantially similar rule is unrealistic for
the time being. 201 The repeal was a huge victory for big banks, and with
Richard Cordray being replaced with a bank-friendly President Trump
appointee, the possibility of a similar rule coming up again within the
next few years is virtually nonexistent. 202
194. McHenry, supra note 21.
195. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210.
196. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (explaining the rule would allow

consumers to sue where they previously could not); Reid, supra note 71 (claiming rule will
pressure industry into better behavior); Resnik, supra note 17 (stating that class action suits
will spread wealth from industry mistakes).
197. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210.
198. Id.
199. See McHenry, supra note 21 (“[W]e urge you to… develop a less divisive, more
reasonable approach that preserved arbitration as a viable, available, affordable means of
dispute resolution and respects the decisions of consumers.”).
200. See Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated, supra note 156 (explaining the significance of
the repeal of the Final Rule on the CFPB’s ability to pass a similar rule in the future).
201. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2016).
202. Berry, Turning Point, supra note 157; see McKendry, supra note 6 (discussing
whether this repeal will lead to more rollback of more bank regulations); see Dexheimer,
supra note 170, at 5 (discussing the impact of Cordray’s resignation).

2018]

ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

189
REBECCA D. FLOYD*

*I

am grateful to Roy Dixon, Patrick Conlon, Nancy Coppola, and Professor Lissa Broome
for their comments and guidance during the writing and editing process. To my mom, stepdad, and brother, thank you for your endless support and encouragement throughout my law
school career.

